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The Diplomatic Background of Austria’s and 
Prussia’s Military Assistance to the Ottoman  
Empire in the 1830s1 
 
MIROSLAV ŠEDIVÝ 
 
The presence of Prussia’s military officers in the Ottoman army in the late 
1830s has usually been narrated according to the accounts of one of these 
officers, Helmuth von Moltke, who achieved splendid glory in the Euro-
pean battlefields later in the century, and whose published letters have 
served as the principal and almost exclusive source of information for his-
torians dealing with this topic. Other documents like the reports of a Prus-
sian envoy in Constantinople have been almost entirely omitted, even dur-
ing attempts to explain not only the military significance of the mission 
but also its diplomatic origins. Consequently, no study analysing the topic 
from a broader diplomatic spectrum exists, and there remains much to be 
said and some errors to be corrected in what has already been written. 
The diplomatic background cannot be ignored due to the simple 
fact that the Prussian military mission was closely associated with the Eu-
ropean Powers’ struggle for influence over the sultan’s court, in other 
words the Prussian officers’ presence in the Levant was an integral part of 
the so-called Eastern Question. Moreover, it has almost been forgotten that 
the second German Power, Austria, was also extensively engaged in this 
respect. Though the Viennese cabinet failed to establish its own military 
advisers in Sultan Mahmud II’s service, at least during the time spent there 
by those from Prussia, it also contributed to the reforms in the Ottoman 
army, though in a different way. Its diplomatic role was far more im-
portant than that of Prussia because the joint Austrian-Russian diplomatic 
intervention in Constantinople frustrated the employment of French and 
British officers in the Ottoman army and navy in 1835/36 and opened the 
door for the Prussians. Despite Austria’s significant role, the reports of an 
Austrian representative in Constantinople as well as other archival docu-
ments housed in Vienna have also remained unnoticed by historians, and if 
several brief surveys have been written on Prussia’s military assistance to 
the Ottoman Empire during that period, one can claim without exaggera-
tion that barely a few words have been dedicated to that of Austria’s role. 
                                            
1 This study has been published as a part of the research project Metternich a Východní 
otázka 1821–1841 (Metternich and the Eastern Question 1821–1841) financed by the 
Czech Science Foundation (GA ČR P410/10/P027). 
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The primary goal of this paper is to put the assistance of the two 
German Powers to the Ottoman military reforms into the context of dip-
lomatic relations within the Eastern Question, to explain why the Sublime 
Porte asked Prussia as well as Austria to supply their officers and why 
only the Prussians were finally employed in 1837. I would also like to 
point out the fact that the collaboration of the two German Powers with 
Mahmud II in his reformatory effort must be viewed not only in the dip-
lomatic but also in the social context – the changes in the Ottoman army 
had been attentively observed by Austria’s and Prussia’s diplomats, and 
by Metternich in particular. In fact, they paid considerable attention to 
developments within the Ottoman army long before the employment of the 
two Powers’ officers in the Near East was officially discussed with Otto-
man leaders, and the Austrian cabinet had even provided the education of 
several Ottoman youths in the Viennese Technical military academy. The 
paper is finally intended as a brief contribution to the relations between 
Central Europe, represented in this case by the two most important mem-
bers of the German Confederation, and the Ottoman Empire, as well as to 
the Ottoman reform movement itself, in the 1830s. 
From the diplomatic and social point of view, the course of events 
presented here cannot be started in 1835, when Sultan Mahmud II decided 
to ask Prussia and Austria for their military officers, but already in 1826 
when the same sultan dissolved the Janissaries and launched a vigorous 
reformatory process2 particularly affecting the Ottoman army, which could 
not go unnoticed by Austrian and Prussian representatives in Constantino-
ple. Their reports contained scepticism identical to that expressed by 
Moltke during his later stay in the Levant; they pointed out on the one 
hand the sultan’s sincere wish to create a functioning regular army as well 
as on the other his lack of knowledge in how to achieve this goal. The 
monarch’s inexperience would not have mattered if he had been surround-
ed by skilful and capable advisers familiar with the European art of war 
and the reasons for its superiority over the Ottoman warfare, but this was 
not Mahmud II’s case. The Austrian internuncio in Constantinople, Franz 
von Ottenfels, wrote in July 1832:  
 
“This is not at all the time when Sultan Mahmud can hope to 
realise the project [of reforms]. His intentions are certainly 
laudable and one cannot praise enough the determination 
and perseverance with which he pursues his goal. But this 
sovereign himself is largely inerudite and surrounded by ad-
                                            
2 Z. ZAKIA, The Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839), in: K. ÇIÇEK (Ed.), The 
Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation, Vol. 1: Politics, Ankara 2000, p. 420. 
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visers who are too ignorant and too interested in flattering 
him and hiding the truth to know which proper means he 
ought to choose for implementing his ideas.”3 
 
This criticism shared also by Ottenfels’ successor, Bartolomäus 
von Stürmer, and several Prussian envoys in the 1820s and 1830s4 was 
particularly held by the man who for a long time was responsible for mili-
tary reforms and who played an important role in the story of Austria’s 
and Prussia’s assistance in this sphere: Husrev Pasha. He was no supporter 
of radical changes in Ottoman society, but he did not oppose the reforms 
in the army of which he was in charge from 1827 to 1837 as its command-
er-in-chief (serasker), and he was also able to influence its structure from 
March 1838 when he became president of the supreme counsel. The main 
reason for his active role in the military reforms seemed to be his unceas-
ing desire to remain in his monarch’s favour, but, as well as his master, he 
lacked the relevant knowledge, and consequently he offered rather dubious 
assistance in the improvements in the Ottoman armed forces.5 The Prus-
sian envoy in Constantinople since 1835, Baron von Königsmarck, de-
scribed Husrev’s character and actions in these unflattering words: 
 
“In all seasons and in all weather he [Husrev Pasha] is seen 
browsing around Constantinople, the Bosphorus and its en-
virons, in a boat, on a horse, in a coach, on foot; he is eve-
rywhere and he meddles with everything. But with all this ac-
tivity he only dabbles in matters without investigating any; he 
                                            
3 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna (henceforth: HHStA), Staatenabteilungen 
(henceforth: StA), Türkei VI, 54, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 July 1832; 
Two months later, Ottenfels expressed this opinion again: “Mahmud wants to do good, 
but he lacks capable subjects who could put his plans into effect.” HHStA, StA, Türkei 
VI, 54, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 Sept. 1832. 
4 For all see HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 14 May 
1829, Türkei VI, 17, Malaguzziny to Metternich, Vienna, 19 April 1830; Geheimes 
Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin (henceforth: GStA PK), HA III, Ministe-
rium des Auswärtigen I (henceforth: MdA I), 7280, Königsmarck to Frederick William 
III, Büyükdere, 4 April and 8 Aug. 1838, MdA I, 7281, Königsmarck to Frederick Wil-
liam III, Büyükdere, 6 Nov. 1839. 
5 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 14 May and 5 
Sept. 1829, Türkei VI, 50, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 May 1830, Türkei 
VI, 57, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 30 March 1833; GStA PK, HA III, MdA 
I, 7257, Miltitz to Frederick William III, Pera, 10 May 1823, MdA I, 7264, Miltitz to 
Frederick William III, Pera, 10 Feb. 1827, MdA I, 7267, Stiepovich [?] to Royer, Pera, 22 
June 1829, MdA I, 7281, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 26 June 
1839, MdA I, 7279, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 28 March 1838, 
MdA I, 7281, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 26 June 1839. 
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starts everything but he finishes nothing. A skilful courtier, 
he would always like to have something new and pleasant to 
tell his master, to propound several new inventions to him, to 
propose improvements in military organisation or civil ad-
ministration, but he immediately abandons his projects, some 
of them even wise and beneficial, as soon as he notices that 
they no more amuse the fickle humour of His Highness. The 
serasker seriously cares only for topics that flatter the vanity 
of the sultan.”6 
 
Mahmud II’s and his advisers’ lack of savoir-faire, their ignorance 
of the real reasons for the technological and economic superiority of the 
West over the Levant, the monarch’s impatience, in other words his wish 
to see the results of his reformatory effort during his lifetime, and his ad-
visers’ incompetence and liking for intrigues often contributed, according 
to German speaking diplomats, to the wrong implementation of Western 
patterns and entirely unnecessary and pointless measures like the orders 
concerning the implementation of European-style clothing or the shorten-
ing of traditional long male beards.7 This was also manifested in the Ot-
toman army, where the attempts to come closer to the West brought 
changes that did not meet with the approval of European experts like 
French General Lieutenant Count Osery, brother-in-law of Marshal Jean 
Victor Marie Moreau and a hero of the Napoleonic wars in which he lost 
an arm. Osery had stayed in Constantinople in the late 1820s where Aus-
tria had supported his employment in the Ottoman army, which finally did 
not happen owing to Moreau’s family’s good relations with the tsar who 
was waging war with the sultan during that period.8 He discussed the con-
ditions of the Ottoman armed forces with Ottenfels; his views were identi-
cal or very similar to those of Austrian and Prussian diplomats or later 
those of Moltke.9 Osery was very critical and, for example, he could not 
                                            
6 GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7278, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 19 
Oct. 1836,  
7 A. von PROKESCH-OSTEN, Über die dermaligen Reformen im türkischen Reiche, 
1832, in: Kleine Schriften, Bd. 5, Stuttgart 1844, p. 401; GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7278, 
Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 5 Oct. 1836, MdA I, 7279, Königs-
marck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 4 and 11 Jan. 1837; HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 
66, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 18 Jan. 1837. 
8 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39, Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 3 April 1829, Türkei VI, 
37, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 25 May 1829. 
9 For all see GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7276, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, 
Büyükdere, 25 Nov. 1835, MdA I, 7278, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyük-
dere, 5 Oct. 1836, MdA I, 7279, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 4 
Jan. 1837. 
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understand why at that time the excellent Ottoman cavalry had been re-
structured according to the European model and had thus lost many of the 
characteristics that had previously made this component of the sultan’s 
army a respected enemy even among the Cossacks:  
 
“The Turkish cavalry was one of the best units of the Otto-
man Empire; it always was superior to the Russian cavalry; 
what it lacked was good direction and to be employed in an 
appropriate way effectively. Instead of leaving it as it was 
and adding brave and intelligent officers who would know 
how to lead it into combat where it could offer useful and de-
cisive service, attempts have been made to transform it into a 
European cavalry and to replace their [the Ottomans’] tradi-
tional Turkish or Cossack saddles to which they have been 
accustomed since their childhood with saddles of European 
style with stirrups in which they do not know how to remain 
seated.”10 
 
Though these words are hard to believe, their validity were con-
firmed by Russian diplomat Alexej Fedorovic Count Orlov staying in 
Constantinople in late 1829 and early 1830, who, after seeing a military 
parade of an Ottoman cavalry recently organised after the European fash-
ion, told Ottenfels that several riders unable to remain in their new saddles 
had fallen off their horses:  
 
“I would desire to know the name of the foreign instructor 
who directs the exercises of these troops in order to be able 
to propose to the emperor [tsar] that he should decorate him 
with one of his medals because he taught the Turks to fall off 
their horses, which would not have happened if they had rid-
den on their traditional saddles.”11 
 
The unknown foreigner training the Ottoman troops mentioned by 
Orlov is important for this paper’s topic because it points to one of the 
most serious problems concerning the new Ottoman regular army – the 
lack of well trained officers. Mahmud II, who often declared that “one of 
my eyes is fixed on my son, the other on my soldiers,”12 was well aware of 
                                            
10 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 14 May 1829. 
11 Hrvatski državni arhiv in Zagreb (henceforth: HDA), 750, Obitelj Ottenfels (hence-
forth: OO) 18, F. von Ottenfels, Memoari Franze Ottenfelsa, p. 222. 
12 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 17, Malaguzziny to Metternich, Vienna, 19 April 1830. 
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this fact. He had two possibilities with regard to the training of his troops: 
to send Ottoman youths to European military schools or train them in 
schools that would be established in his Empire and led by European mili-
tary instructors. In the 1830’s he decided to adopt both methods, which, 
however, attracted the attention of some European Powers, and their rival-
ry in the Near East showed itself even in this affair, making the European 
assistance to the Ottoman military reforms a part of the Eastern Question. 
Prussia generally stood apart, but the Viennese cabinet was fully involved 
in it from the very beginning. 
In late 1829, Mahmud II occupied himself with the project to send 
Ottoman students to France to obtain a technical and military education. 
He was influenced by news of Egyptian students having been successfully 
sent to France by his Egyptian Governor Mohammed Ali some years be-
fore. With his characteristic impatience, Mahmud II wanted to follow the 
example of his powerful vassal as soon as possible and was strongly sup-
ported in this plan by Husrev Pasha, whose pro-French sympathies were 
well known. Mahmud II took it a step further, wanting to send the students 
not only to France but also to Great Britain and Austria. His Private Secre-
tary Mustafa Bey discussed this topic with Ottenfels, who readily assured 
the Ottoman dignitary about the readiness of Austria to satisfy the re-
quest.13 This was completely true because the Viennese cabinet was more 
than willing to welcome Ottoman students. In Metternich’s and Ottenfels’ 
opinion, Vienna was an ideal place for the young Ottomans to obtain a 
solid education without the danger of being influenced by what they con-
sidered to be improper ideas. Austrian Emperor Francis I did not hesitate 
to offer his capital for this purpose, and Ottenfels was instructed in early 
January to convey the proposal to the sultan’s court.14 
The offer was sincerely meant, but its main goal undoubtedly was 
to offer an alternative to the idea of sending Ottoman students to France, 
which did not please the cabinet in Vienna. Though Metternich supported 
the idea of acquainting young Ottomans with the sciences as studied and 
practiced by Europeans, he criticised the choice of the destination and 
considered it one of the many mistakes frequently committed by the sultan 
in his effort to reform his declining empire. Because of the revolution and 
because of Napoleon himself, Metternich – and many Europeans – consid-
ered France to be a country corrupted by dubious ideas, which, if brought 
                                            
13 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 49, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 Dec. 1829. 
More on Husrev Pasha’s pro-French sympathies HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 50, Ottenfels to 
Metternich, Constantinople, 25 Jan. 1830, Türkei VI, 17, Malaguzziny to Metternich, 
Vienna, 19 April 1830; GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7269, Royer to Frederick William III, 
Pera, 12 Jan. 1830. 
14 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 51, Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 2 Jan. 1830. 
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back to Istanbul by students influenced by those ideas, could disrupt the 
government and society and potentially damage the Ottoman Empire as 
well as the Danube Monarchy.15 Consequently, the chancellor instructed 
the internuncio in early January to thwart the French aspect of the project 
and did not forget to mention a month later that “sending men to us will 
always be less dangerous for the Porte than dispatching them to other 
places. The young Turks, like the officers, will find in our country a useful 
direction or, what is equal, a Mohammedan direction.”16  
In this respect, Ottenfels skilfully acquitted his task. He had often 
opposed the sultan’s intention to send Ottoman youths to France for train-
ing before the arrival of Metternich’s January instructions, and these pro-
vided him with the additional needed support for his objections. Conse-
quently, he succeeded in persuading the Porte not to send Ottoman stu-
dents to France, at least for that moment.17 As for sending the youths to 
Austria, the Emperor’s offer was accepted positively by the sultan and his 
retinue18 but it was not put into effect until late 1834 when five Ottoman 
students were sent to Austria for training in the Technical military acade-
my (K. k. Ingenieurakademie) situated in the building of the Savoy Riding 
Academy (Laimgrube) in Vienna.19 They formed, in Metternich’s words, 
something like an “Ottoman military academy”20 under the direction of 
Captain Franz von Hauslab, an extraordinarily learned absolvent of the 
same academy, who was an instructor at this institute and who had also 
been the personal educator of Archduke Charles’ children since 1833 and 
the next Emperor, Franz Joseph I, after 1843. Hauslab had lived in Con-
stantinople for two years, learned Turkish and later visited the city to per-
sonally bring the students to the Austrian capital.21 Nevertheless, the sending 
                                            
15 Ibid. 
16 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 51, Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 3 Feb. 1830. 
17 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 50, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 25 Jan. 1830. 
18 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 50, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 11 Jan. 1830.  
19 Just a few words on the topic can be found in three books, unfortunately with some 
factual errors. M. BRUNNER, H. KERCHNAWE, 225 Jahre Technische Militärakade-
mie 1717 bis 1942, Wien, 1942, p. 44; F. GATTI, Geschichte der k. u. k. Technischen 
Militär-Akademie. Bd. I: Geschichte der k.k. Ingenieur- und k.k. Genie-Akademie 1717–
1869, Wien 1901, p. 554; H. SCHALK, 250 Jahre militärtechnische Ausbildung in Ös-
terreich, Wien 1968, p. 101. 
20 HHStA, StA, Türkei VIII, 20, Metternich to Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Vienna, 10 Nov. 
1840. 
21 HDA, 750, OO 18, Memoari Franze Ottenfelsa, p. 224; HHStA, StA, Türkei VIII, 8, 
Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 11 Feb. 1835, Türkei VIII, 24, Metternich to 
Stürmer, Vienna, 17. Sept. 1834, Türkei VIII, 10, Mavrojény to Metternich, Vienna, 23. 
Oct. 1837; GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7275, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, 
Büyükdere, 21 July 1835, MdA I, 7276, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Pera, 30 
Dec. 1835, MdA I, 7277, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Pera, 17 Feb. 1836; 
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of the young Ottomans was not a real diplomatic success for Austria be-
cause other groups were sent in 1835 to Great Britain, Prussia and 
France.22 
The youths arriving to the city on the Danube in 1834 and 1837 fi-
nally graduated from the academy and, moreover, demonstrated many 
skills and abilities.23 This is proved by their very good schoolwork and 
exam results24 as well as the report about their education written some 
months after Mahmud II’s death by the Bavarian envoy in Vienna, Maxi-
milian Emanuel von Lerchenfeld-Aham, in late November 1839: 
 
“Of all the measures that the late sultan [Mahmud II] under-
took for the civilisation of his nation, the sending of young 
people abroad for their studies and to learn the military sci-
ences has been the most successful. Many young Turks sent 
by their government are here to experience military service 
and master the art of war. These youths do the service to-
gether with the troops. They ride in the ranks, command the 
drills of their platoons in Turkish uniforms, and distinguish 
themselves by their zeal and their diligence. In the past au-
tumn during an artillery exercise, these young Turks operat-
ed their cannon and fired with such an accuracy that assured 
them the praise of all the General officers. In the examina-
tion at the school of artillery, the professor of astronomy, Mr 
Littzow, invited to assist, gave them some very difficult prob-
lems, which they solved in an excellent manner. There are 
some students among them who are attending the technical 
school and who are making very good progress. All these 
students speak German and French and they can be often 
seen at the theatre.”25 
 
Lerchenfeld’s favourable evaluation reflected the positive attitude 
of the involved Austrian elites towards the practice of sending Ottoman 
                                                                                                             
Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich (henceforth: BHStA), Ministerium des Äußern 
(henceforth: MA), Wien 2408, Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 29. Nov. 
1839; SCHALK, p. 101. 
22 N. BERKES, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Montreal 1964, p. 128; K. 
KREISER, Türkische Studenten in Europa, in: G. HÖPP (Ed.), Fremde Erfahrungen. 
Asiaten und Afrikaner in Deutschland, Österreich und in der Schweiz bis 1945, Berlin 
1996, pp. 385–400. 
23 Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 5 July 1837, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 66. 
24 Brunner, p. 44; Gatti, p. 554. 
25 BHStA, MA, Wien 2408, Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 29 Nov. 1839. 
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students to the Habsburg Empire. For example, Archduke Johann told the 
Bavarian envoy in late 1837: 
 
“If thirty military cadets to Vienna for training, they will be 
sufficient in number in a few years to organise and discipline 
several exemplary battalions. These in their turn would in-
struct other officers and petty officers, who could be later 
deployed in different regiments. The adoption of this system 
will lead to good results. The young Turkish officers who stay 
here for their education for a couple of years effectively dis-
play the best motivation and natural abilities. They take part 
in the training of the troops, they even command the pla-
toons, in a word they seek to educate themselves, and some of 
them already speak German well enough to be able to suc-
cessfully watch theatrical performances.”26 
 
There is no reason to doubt that this view was sincere, but the ef-
fort to obtain further students under Austria’s supervision was undoubted-
ly increased by the opportunity for Austria to have influence that it could 
later exert through them in the Ottoman Empire. Leopold von Haan, who 
accompanied Archduke Johann to Constantinople in October 1837, ex-
plained the reasons for such an expectation: “There have to be future po-
litical benefits for the state where such people are trained because next to 
the love for one’s native country there also remains the affection for the 
country where one was educated.”27 Metternich naturally was well aware 
of this fact, which is evident in the attention he paid to the presence of the 
Ottoman youths in Vienna and the supervising role of Hauslab, who was 
the man who deserved the greatest merit for the students’ swift progress. 
Unsurprisingly, Mahmud II rewarded him in early 1835 with words of 
praise and a box ornamented with diamonds,28 and when Hauslab was 
promoted to a squadron leader and his duties were to take him away from 
Vienna, Metternich intervened and ensured his continued tutorial role at 
the academy and in the higher rank because Hauslab was in a position to 
play an important role in the Porte’s decision making whether to send 
more students to Austria.29 
                                            
26 BHStA, MA, Wien 2407, Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 31 Dec. 1837. 
27 V. von HAAN (Ed.), Erzherzog Johann von Österreich, Leopold von Haan. Eine rus-
sisch-türkische Reise im Jahre 1837, Wien 1998, p. 183. 
28 HHStA, StA, Türkei VIII, 8, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 11 Feb. 1835, 
Türkei VIII, 8, Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 3 March 1835. 
29 HHStA, StA, Türkei VIII, 24, Metternich to Rifaat Bey, Vienna, 28 July 1838. 
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Consequently, when Johann announced during his stay in Constan-
tinople in 1837 that Austria was prepared to receive further Ottoman stu-
dents,30 Hauslab was already a member of the archduke’s retinue and 
probably contributed to Mahmud II’s decision to send another group of six 
young Ottomans to Vienna for a military education. Hauslab personally 
escorted them from Constantinople on 27 November.31 This perfectly 
dovetailed into the policy pursued by Metternich, who continued to attach 
importance to the presence of Ottoman students and encouraged the in-
crease in their number in following years. He repeatedly advised the Porte 
to make the best of the functional “institution” producing capable offic-
ers.32 He repeated in 1840 what he had declared ten years earlier, that the 
students sent to Vienna would return home 
 
“as good Moslems, well trained and competent in all kinds of 
service that one would want to assign them. They will not in-
troduce into their homeland fantastic ideas incompatible with 
the spirit and customs of the country. These men will know 
what is useful and practical and nothing in their way of 
thinking will be altered.”33  
 
According to Metternich, Johann and most of other involved Aus-
trians, the Ottoman students’ studies abroad were much more useful than 
the employment of foreigners in the Ottoman army. Moltke and Prince 
August of Prussia, the latter staying in Constantinople for a while at the 
same time as Johann, also shared this view. Prince August stated in his 
essay on the Ottoman army written in late 1837 or early 1838 that the 
Prussian officers functioning in the sultan’s service at that time were en-
tirely insufficient for the implementation of useful reforms, that increasing 
the number of foreign officers would not prove more successful, for ex-
ample owing to the language barrier, and that sending young Ottomans to 
                                            
30 B. SUTTER, Die Reise Erzherzog Johanns 1837 nach Russland, Konstantinopel und 
Athen, in: W. KOSCHATZKY (Ed.), Thomas Ender (1793–1875), Wien, 1964, p. 38; 
HAAN, pp. 201–202. 
31 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 66, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 11 Oct. 1837, 
Türkei VIII, 10, Mavrojény to Metternich, Vienna, 23 Oct. 1837, Türkei VIII, 10, 
Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 29 Nov. 1837; GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7279, 
Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 29 Nov. 1837. 
32 HHStA, StA, Türkei VIII, 20, Metternich to Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Vienna, 10 Nov. 
1840, Türkei VIII, 15, Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 10 Nov. 1840, Türkei VIII, 15, 
Ahmed Fethi Pasha to Metternich, Constantinople, 8 Dec. 1840. 
33 HHStA, StA, Türkei VIII, 20, Metternich to Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Vienna, 10 Nov. 
1840. 
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Europe was far more reasonable.34 However, Mahmud II was of a differ-
ent opinion and he also wished to improve his army through the 
knowledge and skills of European officers employed in his service. 
As well as in the case of the plan to send Ottoman youths to Eu-
rope, the idea of a foreign military mission in the Ottoman Empire also 
had its Egyptian example. The employment of French officers by Mo-
hammed Ali had proved itself to be beneficial and the Egyptian troops 
trained by them demonstrated their superiority over the Ottoman troops in 
the war between Constantinople and Alexandria in 1832/33. Though some 
French and Italian military adventurers, particularly those of lower ranks 
without the knowledge necessary for the vast reforms, had already been 
employed in the Ottoman army, their impact on the troops to which they 
were detached with limited powers was extremely questionable.35 Conse-
quently, in mid 1830s, Mahmud II decided to follow Mohammed Ali’s 
example again, this time in hiring a larger number of French officers. He 
planned to send them to a military academy in Constantinople established 
in 1834, in other words to ask for a French military mission.36 The Otto-
man plenipotentiary in Paris, Mustafa Reshid Bey, was instructed to dis-
cuss this matter with the French government. This was the revival of a 
project of the former French ambassador in Constantinople, Armand-
Charles Count Guilleminot, from 1830. In that year, the high costs of the 
proposed school for 200–300 students and the counterarguments of Count 
Orlov seemed to lead the Porte to put the plan on hold. Four years later, 
Husrev Pasha revived the idea, attaching great importance to it. As Met-
ternich learned, the Porte planned to hire 30 French officers: 15 for the 
training of the regular army and 15 for training the imperial guard.37  
The chancellor was not naturally indifferent to this project. Though 
he agreed with the necessity of reforms in the Ottoman Empire, he consid-
ered it dangerous to entrust the creation of a regular and disciplined army 
only to French officers for two reasons: First, it would considerably 
strengthen the influence of France on the Bosphorus. Something similar had 
already happened in Egypt, where France increased its influence by placing 
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French personnel in Mohammed Ali’s service. Metternich worried that 
France could achieve similar success in Constantinople. The second reason 
for his negative attitude was concern that the uniforms of the French in-
structors concealed individuals propagating revolutionary ideas and subver-
sive dogmas threatening the order and tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire.38 
He was afraid of the spread of these ideas in the very heart of the Empire: 
 
“The peace and tranquillity of the capital of the Ottoman Em-
pire could be jeopardized due to such a great number of 
French officers among whom, one must admit, there will be 
some who, in the guise of instructors, will try to sow [the seeds 
of] revolutionary ideas and beliefs subversive to the existing 
order in Turkey.”39 
 
For these reasons Metternich ordered the new Austrian internuncio 
in Constantinople, Baron Bartolomäus Stürmer, to forestall the foundation 
of the military academy led by the French officers.40 At the same time, he 
informed Saint Petersburg about this plan with the goal of securing Russian 
support, which was not too difficult given the tsar’s shared antipathy to-
wards France and the Russian-French tensions in the Near East. Russian 
Vice-Chancellor Karl Robert Count Nesserlode made the same arguments 
as Metternich against French activities in Constantinople and the employ-
ment of the French in the military academy.41 In a letter to the Russian am-
bassador, Apollinarij Petrovic Count Butenev, Nesselrode presumed that 
Butenev had surely cooperated with Stürmer “over the best measures to 
employ for forestalling the execution of a project with which we disagree 
with the same force and for the same reason as the court in Vienna.”42 Met-
ternich’s determination to thwart the project was strengthened on learning 
of the identical attitude of the tsar’s court, and he even asked for the support 
of conservative British Prime Minister Duke Wellington, who expressed his 
regret of the Porte’s one-sided pro-French orientation in this affair though 
nothing indicates that he wished to become involved with the matter.43 
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Husrev Pasha and some other Ottoman dignitaries denied the exist-
ence of the project and assured Stürmer that they understood the danger in 
young Ottomans being instructed in an academy led by French officers. In 
contrast, Reis Efendi (Foreign Minister) Mehmed Akif recognised its ex-
istence but declared he was against it.44 Akif was in good relations with 
Stürmer and Butenev and it was he who helped them to persuade the Di-
van at the beginning of March to devise new instructions for Mustafa 
Resid Bey. According to these instructions, if Mustafa Resid still had not 
made any arrangement concerning the delegation of the French professors 
and officers to Constantinople, he was to quietly abandon the plan. In the 
event that a preliminary agreement had been arranged, he was to take no 
further steps and conclude nothing definitive. If the whole affair had al-
ready been settled beyond recall, the French were to be allowed to come to 
the Ottoman capital but not be employed in the army. The sultan gave his 
full consent to the instructions and they were immediately sent to Paris.45 
In April 1835, the tensions arising from the planned foundation of 
the French military academy were finally averted. Mustafa Resid Bey re-
ceived instructions before he had a definite settlement with the Parisian 
cabinet and abandoned the project without any difficulty. No French offic-
ers were employed in the Ottoman military academy during Mahmud II’s 
lifetime, including the two or three French officers who were signed on by 
Resid before he obtained his counter-order and who arrived in Constanti-
nople in March 1836.46 Stürmer and Butenev undoubtedly deserved the 
lion’s share of the credit for making this happen. 
 Nevertheless, Metternich’s vigilance was also important. In addi-
tion, he continued to observe the employment of foreign officers by the 
Ottomans and he did not hesitate to oppose other French assistance if and 
when it was necessary.47 As to other French officers serving in the Otto-
man army from earlier periods, their sacking en masse in late 1836 can be 
hardly ascribed to anything other than the concentrated Austrian-Russian 
diplomatic pressure.48 In the mid-1830s, Metternich also supported the 
Russian effort against Palmerston’s attempt to deploy British officers in 
                                            
44 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 63, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 28 Jan. and 25 
Feb. 1835. 
45 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 63, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 4 March 1835. 
46 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 64, Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 8 April 1835, Türkei VI, 
63, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 22 April 1835, Türkei VI, 64, Stürmer to 
Metternich, Constantinople, 30 March 1836; GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7275, Kö-
nigsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 21 July 1835, MdA I, 7277, Kö-
nigsmarck to Frederick William III, Pera, 30 March 1836; BERKES, pp. 111–112. 
47 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 65, Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 26 and 27 Jan. 1836.  
48 The National Archives, London, Kew (henceforth: TNA), Foreign Office (henceforth: 
FO) 78/278, Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 28 Dec. 1836. 
Miroslav Šedivý  
The Diplomatic Background of Austria’s and Prussia’s Military Assistance to the Otto-
man Empire in the 1830s 
 
162 
the Ottoman army and navy, and particularly against Polish General 
Wojciech Chrzanowsky in Eastern Anatolia, whose posting was instigated 
by the British foreign secretary. As with the French military instructors 
and officers, Metternich was also successful in the case of Chrzanowsky 
and the British officers: the former had no significant influence on the 
Ottoman army and was soon removed, and the latter were never employed 
by the sultan.49 
Some of these Austrian-Russian victories were undoubtedly 
achieved with the help of, first, the Churchill affair from the late spring 
and summer of 1836 when the maltreatment of the British citizen by Ot-
toman officials led to the rather hostile and menacing conduct of the Brit-
ish ambassador, John Lord Ponsonby, towards the Porte,50 and, second, 
the tsar’s decision made in the same year to forgive a part of the sultan’s 
war indemnities from the last Russian-Ottoman war and evacuate Silistria 
occupied by Russian forces since 1829.51 The former definitely made the 
employment of the British in the Ottoman armed forces an impossible task 
and, together with the latter, probably strengthened the sultan’s decision 
made earlier to look for officers in the conservative countries. 
Mahmud II’s acquiescence under the Austrian-Russian pressure 
did not mean that he gave up his plan for the employment of foreign mili-
tary advisers, but rather he only planned to modify his choice. Already in 
July 1835, Husrev Pasha informed Königsmarck about the sultan’s wish to 
employ several Prussian artillerymen,52 but since Königsmarck obtained 
no answer from his king, he thought that Frederick William III was un-
willing to grant the request and did not discuss the affair any more. How-
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ever, the Porte itself raised the issue again at the end of the year and made 
a formal request at the beginning of 1836. It asked for 15 Prussians in-
structors – 11 officers and 4 non-commissioned officers – to be sent to 
Constantinople for three years: 1 officer for teaching military geography 
and military history; 1 officer for teaching the art of mapping; 1 officer for 
teaching mathematics; 2 officers for teaching French; 2 officers as artillery 
instructors with 2 non-commissioned officers; 1 officers as a cavalry in-
structor with 2 non-commissioned officers; 1 officer with the knowledge 
of the art of war and light fortification; 2 officers for teaching military 
economy. At that point, Frederick William III gave his consent to their 
employment in Ottoman service.53 
What were the reasons for the sultan’s swing to Prussia? Historians 
have generally explained this decision by, first, Prussia’s limited activity 
in the Eastern Question being more palatable to the sultan than the other 
Powers’ active struggle for the predominant influence over his court, se-
cond, Moltke’s presence in the Ottoman Empire since October 1835, and 
third, the delivery of Marquis Caraman’s work Essai sur l’organisation 
militaire de la Prusse from 1831 of which the Turkish translation gripped 
Mahmud II because it described the Prussian effective military reform 
carried out at minimum possible expenses.54 One must add, however, that 
particularly the second and third factors merely increased the already ex-
isting reputation of excellence of the Prussian army held by the Ottomans; 
it was no accident that they were so interested in Prussian artillerymen 
because they believed in the superiority of Prussia’s artillery and nick-
named all Prussians “those artillerymen”.55 Celui d’artilleurs Mahmud II 
himself thought a great deal not only of Peter I the Great or Napoleon Bona-
parte but also Frederick II the Great,56 and Husrev was after 1835 as much 
pro-Prussian as he had been earlier pro-French.57 Stürmer even attributed the 
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project of the employment of the Prussian officers to him: “The demand 
for the Prussians is above all the work of the serasker, who is not espe-
cially partial to us and has always had a particular preference for the 
Prussian army.”58 
It is less known that the Porte also asked Austria for its officers. 
Stürmer was first informed about this plan in January 1836 by Akif 
Efendi, who declared that his monarch would like to obtain some profes-
sors and instructors from the country where the Ottoman students had 
made such great progress in their studies in such a short time.59 The formal 
request for six military experts was delivered to Stürmer in February; 
Mahmud II desired to employ 1 professor of geometry, 1 professor of for-
tification and relevant sciences, 1 instructor for the organisation of the 
military academy, 1 instructor of the horse artillery, 1 instructor of the foot 
artillery and 1 hussar for the organisation of a hussar regiment that the 
sultan had long wished for. An affirmative answer came immediately from 
Vienna.60 
Why did the two German Powers agree to the sultan’s request? In 
fact there was no alternative for the cabinets in Berlin and Vienna in early 
1836 other than to satisfy it. After Mahmud II had been prevented from 
employing French and British military advisers, it was no surprise that he 
would turn to other countries with the same demand. A refusal would un-
doubtedly have moved him to turn again to the two liberal Powers, turning 
the victory of conservatism into defeat.61 The tsar convinced the Prussian 
king to agree, but Metternich did not need persuading since he was the 
prominent player in this matter and more than willing to send Austrian 
officers to Constantinople. His desire is evident from the fact that while 
firstly Prussia was not only absolutely passive during the other Powers’ 
struggle for the employment of their own officers in the Ottoman service 
but also rather restrained towards the Porte’s original attempt to obtain 
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Prussian artillerymen, and secondly it did not agree to the sending of the 
officers until the moment when the king realised that the tsar really wanted 
them,62 Metternich had tried since the very beginning to influence the sul-
tan’s choice of the most suitable country for contributing to his military 
reforms. According to Königsmarck, and there is no reason to disbelieve 
him, when Austria and Russia succeeded in preventing the project of the 
Military Academy led by the French, they recommended that the Porte 
appeal in this matter to the governments “whose citizens” morality and the 
principles of order in which they have been brought up would offer better 
guarantees of reliability.’63 
The different roles played by the two German Powers in the affair 
also are clearly evident in the speed of Austria’s answer to the request, the 
enthusiastic style of this answer and finally its willingness to cover almost 
all the expenses of its own officers, which was in sharp contrast to the 
expenses incurred by the Prussians, which were to be completely paid by 
the Porte.64 Other evidence that Austria insisted on the success of this pro-
ject much more so than Prussia can also be found in the behaviour of the 
Viennese court and chancellery towards the extraordinary Ottoman am-
bassador, Ferik Ahmed Fethi Pasha, sent in the summer of 1835 to con-
gratulate new Emperor Ferdinand I on his accession to the throne.65 This 
influential dignitary and officer with the rank equivalent to a division general 
(ferik), about whom Mahmud II once said that “he is my Orlov”,66 was 
welcomed with exceptional warmth, was accommodated in a hotel at the 
expense of the emperor from July to September and was favoured with 
attention far above that required by protocol.67  
As for the honours accorded Ahmed, for example, a military parade 
took place in his honour on 14 August, during which a command and the rank 
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of marshal was conferred on him. When Ahmed expressed his desire to visit a 
considerable number of military places including the fortification of Linz 
or the Military Academy in Wiener-Neustadt, it was immediately granted 
and one can hardly suppose that the Austrians did so without ulterior mo-
tives.68 More than eloquent are the words from a notice on Ahmed’s stay 
in Austria published in the Österreichischer Beobachter that his mission 
would not only strengthen the friendly relations of the two countries but 
also “considerably contribute to the foundation of more helpful institu-
tions and useful facilities in the Ottoman Empire.”69  
 Though the content of discussions between Austrian dignitaries 
and Ahmed is not known, the former undoubtedly desired to increase Aus-
tria’s influence in Constantinople by entering into friendly relations with 
the latter, which could particularly be advantageous in military affairs. The 
first goal was undoubtedly achieved because after his return to the Otto-
man capital in early November 1835, Ahmed demonstrated warm pro-
Austrian sentiment. He was very pleased with the way he had been wel-
comed and treated by the emperor and his court,70 in particular by the 
chancellor and his wife. Metternich purposely stayed in contact with Ah-
med to a degree exceeding that of usual diplomatic correspondence, prov-
ing that the prince tried to maintain very cordial relations with this digni-
tary and use him as a pro-Austrian member of the Ottoman government, in 
particular for the support of the employment of the Austrian officers.71 
When, for instance, Ahmed sent Metternich a gift from Mahmud II the 
sultan’s portrait, in early April 1836, he accompanied a letter with this 
post-scriptum: “I beg of Y.[our] H.[ighness] to remember me kindly to 
Madam the Princess and present her with my humble respects.”72 Metter-
nich’s answer was no less amicable as it is evident in his own post-
scriptum of the letter from late April:  
 
“My wife charges me to extend her greetings to you. She is 
very well and since husbands are always obedient to their 
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wives, I had to allow mine to take possession of His High-
ness’ portrait. She has placed it in her study with the expec-
tation that one day it will become part of my beloved son’s 
inheritance and he will convey it in due course to his own 
son.”73 
 
Metternich’s effort was undoubtedly successful. Ahmed was 
pleased with this approach of the prominent European statesman and general-
ly replied to the chancellor’s letters or the messages conveyed by the in-
ternuncio with much affection and open-heartedness. In late April 1837, 
for example, he wrote to Metternich: 
 
“As for me, My Prince, every hour that rings reminds me of 
your goodness, your kindness and your constant friendship of 
which Y.[our] H.[ighness] has furnished me with so much ev-
idence, and I eagerly wait to be informed about the state of 
your good health always hoping that Y.[our] H.[ighness] will 
never want to cross me out from the top of the list of your 
good servants and friends.”74  
 
A month later, he explained an “order,” to the chancellor expressed 
earlier as a joke “because there is no ceremony between us and, conse-
quently, we believe we can speak openly to one another.”75 Besides the 
cordial attitude towards Metternich accompanied by these almost curious 
expressions of friendship and affection, Ahmed really did provide practi-
cal support in the sultan’s project for the employment of foreign officers 
and sided with Austria in this affair.76 
Nevertheless, Ahmed’s activities finally did not help Austria to 
succeed in supplying military assistance to the sultan and this was finally 
provided only by Prussia. The reason for this shift in the Porte’s attitude is 
not clear. German historian Georg Rosen claimed that it was due to Rus-
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sia’s secret opposition to the presence of Austrian officers in the Levant.77 
Nevertheless, he did so without quoting any relevant documents and this 
view seems to be rather precarious. Though the tsar undoubtedly preferred 
the Prussian military mission, the Austrians were still a much better choice 
than the French or British and, moreover, he urgently needed the support 
of the Habsburg Empire in the Near East; any plots against the employ-
ment of its citizens could have serious consequences if they were revealed, 
which was almost certain in the conditions of the sultan’s court crowded 
with corruptible and devious people. If this happened, it could have seri-
ous consequences for the Russian position in Constantinople where the 
British tried to undermine it with a strong anti-Russian policy78 and, se-
cond, Russia was in an uneasy situation towards the Viennese cabinet ow-
ing to the publication of some Russian diplomatic documents from the late 
1820s containing anti-Austrian views in the British anti-Russian journal 
named Portfolio.79 
The Austrian, Prussian and other diplomatic correspondence stu-
died offers no evidence for Rosen’s theory, and the instructions to Butenev 
from 2 February 1836 in which Nesselrode conveyed the tsar’s pleasure at 
the Porte’s decision to hire Prussian and Austrian military instructors in-
stead of those from Great Britain and France, even prove the opposite. As 
for Austria, Nesselrode called Butenev’s attention to the necessity of main-
taining a close alliance between Saint Petersburg and Vienna at the very 
moment British Foreign Secretary was trying to weaken it or at least give 
the impression that this entente was crumbling. Consequently, there was 
only one possible order for Butenev from Nesselrode in the case of Austri-
an instructors: 
 
“Particularly in the matter of the choice of the Austrian officers, 
convey to the Porte that sending them will arouse neither the envy nor the 
suspicion of the emperor [tsar]. You can even stamp onto the declaration 
                                            
77 G. ROSEN, Geschichte der Türkei von dem Siege der Reform im Jahre 1826 bis zum 
Pariser Tractat vom Jahre 1856, Leipzig 1866, p. 234. 
78 In early 1836, the Russian cabinet even feared an early British-Ottoman rapprochement 
and asked Metternich for support, but this fear was baseless. HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 65, 
Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 3 Feb. 1836. See also Nesselrode’s instructions to Bu-
tenev quoted below. 
79 SAINTE-AULAIRE, Souvenirs (Vienne 1832–1841), Paris 1926, pp. 239–241; M. LAMB, 
Writing up the Eastern Question in 1835–1836, in: The International History Review, 
Vol. 15, No. 2, 1993, pp. 256–266. 
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the character of sincerity and frankness that always carry the assurances 
that come directly from our noble master.”80 
 
Butenev dealt then according to this instruction with the Ottomans.81 
This means that there had to be a different external or internal reason for the 
withdrawal of the request for the Austrian officers. As for the former, it is 
entirely possible that the formerly unsuccessful Western Powers in return 
thwarted Austrian ambitions, but this theory can be proved only with the 
research of relevant documents in British and French archives. On the other 
hand, the Ottoman documents could throw more light onto the attitude of 
the Porte that can be only guessed here. One cannot hide the fact that a 
considerable number of the sultan’s advisers were not favourably inclined to 
Austria, in particular Husrev Pasha.82 Stürmer already reported in February 
1836 on anti-Austrian intrigues at the sultan’s court: 
 
“They have worked from various angles to frustrate 
everything that could give Austria an excessive influence over 
the affairs of this country. As I know from Mr Butenev, at one 
moment there was even a question of demanding only 
Prussian instructors. I said that it was all the same to us, 
considering that it was beneath our dignity to assert ourselves 
to render an unwanted service to the Porte.”83 
 
Although the personal sentiments of the Ottoman dignitaries might 
have played an important role in the fact that only Prussian officers were 
finally hired, Ottoman leaders could also have abandoned the idea of 
employing the Austrians because they planned to reform the army according 
to the Prussian model, and for this purpose the Prussians were a logical 
choice;84 moreover, European officers were to deal with Ottoman batteries 
                                            
80 Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii in Moscow (henceforth: AVPRI), fond 
133, Kantselariia, opis 469, 1836/43, Nesserlode to Butenev, Saint Petersburg, 2 Feb. 
1836. 
81 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 64, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 9 March 1836; 
GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7277, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Pera, 17 Feb. 
1836. 
82 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 17, Malaguzziny to Metternich, Vienna, 19 April 1830, Türkei 
VI, 64, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 and 24 Feb. 1836, Türkei VI, 65, 
Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 11 May 1836. 
83 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 64, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 Feb. 1836. 
84 In early 1841, the Porte refused the proposal of a British ambassador to employ six 
British artillerymen with the explanation that the Ottoman artillery had been reformed 
after the Prussian fashion. HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 80, Stürmer to Metternich, Constanti-
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on the frontier with Austria and it would be illogical for Austrian soldiers to 
train the recruits that would serve against them in the case of an Ottoman-
Austrian war.85 The Austrians could also have been refused for the simple 
reason that the Porte did not know to which purpose they were really to 
serve because the plans for the use of the “German” officers were changed 
in the course of 1836; a few Europeans were to be delegated to various 
Ottoman commanders as advisers. Consequently, 4 officers instead of 15 
from Prussia and none from the Habsburg Empire were to be hired. This 
was announced to Königsmarck in September 1836 and the official request 
was despatched to Berlin in December.86 
Here it is necessary to refute the claim raised by German historian 
Jehuda L. Wallach that the reduction from 15 to 4 was caused by Austrian 
intrigues resulting from envy; there is no sign of such plots in the studied 
documents.87 Austria did not oppose Prussia’s military assistance and alt-
hough the two Great Powers’ negotiations with the Porte proceeded sepa-
rately, Metternich supported the Prussians against the hostility of the British 
cabinet who opposed their forthcoming presence in the Levant, as evident 
from its instructions to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, John 
Lord Ponsonby, who was ordered to tell the Porte that the officers coming 
from Berlin could be regarded “as sent by the Russian government, and for 
purposes unfriendly to England and injurious to Turkey.”88 However, when 
Lord Russel asked the Austrian envoy in Berlin, Joseph Count Trautt-
mannsdorff-Weinsberg, whether Austria did not fear that the Prussian offic-
ers could be the long arm of Russia, the latter did not hesitate to defend the 
usefulness of their presence in the Ottoman Empire.89 
                                                                                                             
nople, 4 March 1841. It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to deal with the degree 
to which the Ottomans reformed their army after the Prussian model, which is, moreover, 
very difficult to do owing to the lack of sources. T. HEINZELMANN, Heiliger Kampf 
oder Landesverteidigung. Die Diskussion um die Einführung der allgemeinen Militär-
pflicht im Osmanischen Reich 1826–1856, Frankfurt am Main 2004, pp. 105–108. Proba-
bly the work of the Ottoman interpreter in Berlin, Carabed, archived in Vienna can serve 
as research material on the topic: HHStA, StK, Interiora–Intercepte, 28, Observations sur 
l’organisation militaire en Prusse et sur son application à l’Empire Ottoman, attached to 
Nouri Efendi to Reshid Pasha, Berlin, 1 Jan. 1840. 
85 GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7277, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Pera, 20 April 
1836. 
86 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 65, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 23 Nov. 1836, The 
Porte’s Memorandum to Königsmarck, 6. Dec. 1836; K. PRÖHL, Die Bedeutung preus-
sischer Politik in den Phasen der orientalischen Frage: ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung 
deutsch-türkischer Beziehungen von 1606 bis 1871, Frankfurt am Main 1986, p. 182; 
HAJJAR, p. 176. 
87 WALLACH, p. 19. 
88 RODKEY, p. 585. 
89 HHStA, StK, Preussen 165, Trauttmannsdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 1 July 1837. 
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The way in which the Porte informed the Viennese cabinet that it 
would not employ its officers was typical for Ottoman diplomacy: it did so 
with complete silence. After the settlement of negotiations between the 
Porte and Stürmer about the status of the Austrians who were to reside in 
the Ottoman Empire,90 the internuncio was informed in late April 1836 
that the discussions would continue in Vienna. For this purpose Ferik 
Ahmed Fethi Pasha was named a permanent Ottoman ambassador.91 
However, the Ottomans never actually reopened negotiations on the 
subject in either the Austrian or Ottoman capital. The delay resulting from 
Ahmed’s journey to Vienna, where he did not arrive until the last day of 
September, already indicated such a strategy, and the members of the 
Divan maintained their silence towards the internuncio much as did 
Ahmed towards Metternich.92 
Since Metternich as well as Stürmer was not inclined to speak out 
in this affair, it came to nothing. The cabinet in Vienna adopted the 
passive attitude as outlined by the internuncio earlier when he had learned 
that the talks would continue in Vienna: 
 
“The matter regarding the instructors is suspended at the 
moment like all the others. I have decided not to talk about it 
with anybody any more but to wait until the moment is 
deemed opportune to reopen the discussion on the topic with 
me. I find this attitude to be the only one appropriate to the 
dignity of the imperial court; any over -eagerness [on our 
part] would cause another disadvantage, that would, among 
others, lead the Porte, by nature so distrustful, to believe that 
we are interested in hastening the despatch of these 
instructors and claiming for ourselves the credit for a service 
that it [the Porte] has to request and acknowledge.”93 
 
Austria’s assumed passivity could not of course escape the 
attention of the second German Power, whose envoy in Vienna, Mortimer 
Count Maltzan, wrote in late December 1836 to Berlin:  
 
                                            
90 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 64, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 Feb. 1836; 
GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7277, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Pera, 6 April 
1836. 
91 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 64, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 20 and 27 April 
1836; TNA, FO 78/274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 16 April 1836. 
92 SS, HD, SG 10026, Wien 93, Report from Vienna, 1 Oct. 1836; GStA PK, HA III, 
MdA I, 6028, Bockelberg to Frederick William III, Vienna, 4 Oct. 1836. 
93 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 65, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 11 May 1836. 
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“Three months have passed since the arrival of the Turkish 
ambassador in Vienna without a word being said about the 
affair in question; the way in which it stops and starts will be 
depend on the moves initiated by the Porte; the imperial 
cabinet has firmly decided in no case to take the initiative.”94 
 
Consequently, only three Prussian officers, Vincke, Fischer and 
Mühlbach, arrived in Constantinople in late August 1837 and joined 
Moltke, the fourth chosen by the king.95 The story of their two-year 
activity in the Levant is too well-known to be repeated here and is not the 
goal of this paper. What can be briefly said, however, is that their 
observations on the Ottoman reform movement and its army, and 
particularly the views of Moltke, entirely confirmed the criticism 
contained in the Prussian and Austrian diplomats’ reports from previous 
years. The service of Moltke and his colleagues had no really positive 
effect on the army because the Ottomans simply did not know how to 
make the best of their qualities. Moreover, the Prussians exercised no real 
power or authority and the soldiers had no reason to listen to them. 
Moltke, Mühlbach and Vincke were finally deployed in 1838 at army 
headquarters, where military commanders were often deaf to their advice. 
This proved to be fatal for Hafiz Pasha, who did not listen to Moltke’s 
warnings before the battle at Nezib with the Egyptian army in June 1839, 
in which he was completely defeated. At that time the two-year period 
assigned to the Prussians was about to terminate and Frederick William III 
decided to recall them. Moltke, Mühlbach and Vincke followed Fischer 
who had departed earlier for home. The battle at Nezib and Mahmud II’s 
death a few days later also resulted in the Porte’s plan to employ several 
Prussian artillery officers, declared in November 1837 and already settled 
with Prussia when the battle took place, not coming to fruition. 
 The presence of the Prussian officers in the sultan’s service was 
not, however, entirely insignificant in the history of the Ottoman Empire, 
because they left behind them documentary evidence probably more im-
portant to diplomatic history than to military history. The reports they 
wrote, and especially those of Moltke, sent to Berlin and read in Vienna, 
were later a valuable source of information, in particular in early 1838 
when a war between Mahmud II and Mohammed Ali seemed to be immi-
nent, or a year later when it actually broke out. Already in September 
                                            
94 GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 6028, Maltzan to Frederick William III, Vienna, 21 Dec. 
1836. 
95 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 66, Stürmer to Metternichi, Büyükdere, 30 Aug. 1837; GStA 
PK, HA III, MdA I, 7279, Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 30 Aug. 
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1836, when Moltke was the only Prussian officer in the sultan’s ser-
vice, Stürmer drew attention to the great informative value of his re-
ports and recommended that Metternich have his own Austrian officer 
in the Ottoman Empire regularly reporting to Vienna, which finally did 
not happen.96 
Though the decision concerning the non-employment of the 
Austrian officers had to be the cause of some disappointment in Vienna, 
hiring the Prussians instead of the French and British was regarded as a 
triumph of conservative diplomacy and definitely offered some 
consolation.97 It also did not prevent Austria from continuing to think 
about cementing its good relations with the Ottoman Empire through its 
own military assistance to the sultan’s military reforms. It is clearly 
evident from the above-mentioned Archduke Johann’s visit to 
Constantinople in October 1837 that resulted in the sending of several 
Ottoman students to Vienna and in the handover of Austria’s gifts of the 
total value of 4,872 florins to Mahmud II by Hauslab on 4 November 
1837. These gifts were generally of a military nature or were intended for 
the use by the army: military material and equipment, models of military 
tools, geometrical instruments for the measurement and completion of 
(military) maps, books and maps of military character.98 Stürmer 
accompanied the presentation of these items with speeches of usual 
diplomatic courtesy and an evident intimation that Mahmud II enjoyed the 
greatest confidence in Austria’s participation in Ottoman military reforms. 
The internuncio started with these words: 
 
“His Majesty the emperor, my most gracious master, knows 
the active interest which Your Majesty ceaselessly pays to the 
creation of your army. He takes a sincere pleasure in it 
                                            
96 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 65, Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 7 Sept. 1836. Metter-
nich gained a certain compensation in the presence of the two physicians in Constantino-
ple, whom Mahmud II requested in 1838. Doctors Neuner and Bernard arrived the Otto-
man capital in early December of the same year. The former soon became the sultan’s 
personal physician and through his reports Metternich was the first European statesman 
in the spring of 1839 to learn of the sultan’s imminent death. The latter became a director 
of the Medico-surgical school in Galata-Serai and informed Metternich about the events 
in the Ottoman Empire in the following years. GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7280, Königs-
marck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 12 Oct. 1838; A. KERNBAUER, Die öster-
reichischen Ärzte in Istanbul und die Großmachtdiplomatie, in: M. SKOPEC, A. KERN-
BAUER (Eds.), Österreichisch-Türkische medizinische Beziehungen historisch und mo-
dern, (Mitteilungen der österreichischen Gesellschaft für Geschichte der Naturwissen-
schaften 10/1990), Wien 1990, pp. 11–14. 
97 HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 67, Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 25 July 1837. 
98 HHStA, StA, Türkei VIII, 10, Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 5 Sept. 1837. 
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because he sees in this glorious effort an important 
assurance for the security of the Ottoman Empire. Always 
ready to contribute to the accomplishment of the useful 
intentions of Your Majesty, as much as it is in his power, the 
emperor has had a selection of models, military tools and 
geometrical instruments made by the best craftsmen in 
Vienna, which, in addition to several maps and military 
equipment, seemed to complete the collection Your Majesty 
already possesses in this respect.”99 
 
Flattery and patience were the only means that Austria had to 
achieve the employment of its own officers in the Ottoman Empire. It 
finally saw this happen during the second war between Constantinople and 
Alexandria when Austria and Great Britain assisted the Ottoman forces in 
the Syrian campaign against Mohammed Ali in 1840/41. In addition to the 
Austrian expeditionary forces fighting on the Syrian coast under Austria’s 
banner, 4 officers were employed directly by the Porte at its own expense. 
The Ottomans requested them in August 1840 with the aim of employing 
them in Syria to build fortification works, and Metternich willingly 
agreed.100 In November 1840, Stürmer introduced them to Sultan 
Abdülmecid I – Lieutenant-Colonel Philippovich, Major Trattner, Major 
Pott, Captain Platzer. The internuncio desired to obtain for them the same 
conditions that Prussian officers had enjoyed in previous years. In early 
December, the Austrians left Constantinople for Syria but what had 
happened to the Prussian officers happened to them too: the Porte in fact 
did not know how to employ them and when they arrived in their 
destination, they realised that they had nothing to do, and they were happy 
when they were recalled home in February 1841.101 
The same fate met Austrian military doctors sent to Syria when the 
Viennese cabinet learnt in early November 1840 of an absolute lack of 
capable physicians and surgeons in the Ottoman army waging war in 
Syria. Metternich immediately initiated the sending of 10 doctors chosen 
                                            
99 HHStA, StA, Türkei VIII, 10, Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 8 Nov. 1837. 
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by the War Council (4 senior officers and 6 junior officers).102 They 
arrived in Syria in late February 1841, where they were to be employed in 
the Ottoman military hospitals. It is certain that they really were active in 
hospitals in Beirout, Jaffa, Acre, Damascus and Sidon, but their service 
was frustrated by many difficulties, for example, the problematic conduct 
of the Ottomans delaying the payment of the agreed salaries and paying 
little interest in the doctors’ work in the disastrous hospital organisation, 
which was, in fact non-existent, and which was something that Moltke had 
also criticised in the Ottoman army some years earlier. To improve the 
existing state of affairs it was necessary to make an enormous effort, but 
the conditions did not permit such an effort, and in mid April 1841 
Stürmer recommended to Metternich the withdrawal of the doctors. Most 
of those who survived the plague which afflicted the region in early 1841 
left Syria in June 1841.103 
With the return of the Austrian officers who had been intended to 
support the fortification works and supply medical treatment from Syria 
back to the Danube Monarchy, the chapter of Prussia’s and Austria’s mili-
tary assistance to the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the nineteenth 
century closed, though a few Ottoman students still remained in Vienna in 
the 1840s. The practical impact of the Prussian as well as Austrian offic-
ers’ presence in the Levant on the modernisation of the Ottoman army was 
negligible and for various reasons far fell behind the accomplishments of 
French officers in Mohammed Ali’s service.104 But one cannot forget that 
the assistance given also included the education of Ottoman students in 
Central Europe, which was not limited to Austria. As for those sent by 
Mahmud II to Prussia, however, the studied correspondence does not offer 
any information and no relevant literature exists. Consequently, though 
education is generally regarded as the most important field of Mahmud 
II’s reforms,105 it is impossible to assess here the significance of the Otto-
man youths’ studies in Austria and Prussia. 
 The diplomatic and social background is probably even more inter-
esting in this chapter of the relations between the two German Powers and 
the Ottoman Empire. As for the former, the events connected with the mil-
itary assistance of Europe were an integral and not at all an unimportant 
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part of the Eastern Question. Since the Great Powers did not want to finish 
off the “sick man on the Bosphorus” in the 1830s, the principal question of 
their Near Eastern policy was not how to divide it but how to preserve it, 
and they vied mainly for influence over the sultan’s court and not for his 
territories. The Ottoman students’ stay in Europe or the European military 
advisers’ presence in the Ottoman army was obviously able to make the 
relations between the sultan and the respective European country more 
cordial. It was a paradox that in the matter of sending officers to the Le-
vant, Prussia was the most successful nation though it did not compete for 
influence over the sultan’s court to same degree, and Austria failed despite 
its considerable desire to employ its subjects in its south-eastern neigh-
bour’s army – the short Syrian episode was an absolute fiasco. Austria’s 
diplomatic pressure pursued in conjunction with Russia was strong enough 
to prevent the employment of French and British officers, but Prussia and 
not Austria finally made the most of supplying military assistance. It is 
also possible that Austria’s obvious efforts encouraged the opposition of 
the formerly unsuccessful Western Powers and disquieted Mahmud II and 
his advisers. Less probably meant more in the affair, and Königsmarck 
seemed to be right when he wrote in his report from February 1836: 
  
“He [Stürmer] told me that Turkey was a beautiful woman 
spoiled by flattery and to whom one must pay court in order 
to obtain favours from her. If our comparison is correct, I 
answered him, I believe that my system would work better 
because I had always thought that to please and captivate 
women of this sort it is necessary to give the impression of 
indifference.”106 
 
 As for the social aspect, the Prussian and Austrian assistance to the 
Porte corresponded with Mahmud II’s reformatory effort and desire to 
carry out changes in the European style – according to models that he tried 
to find not only in France or Great Britain but also in the two German 
Powers. At the same time, Austrian and Prussian representatives in Con-
stantinople carefully observed the changes in the Ottoman Empire, in the 
military in particular, sending careful observations to Vienna and Berlin, 
making from the Ottoman reform movement a series of discussions and a 
matter of diplomatic involvement for Austria and an object of interest for 
Prussia. The two German Powers had already known about this process 
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since before the mid-1830s and contributed to it at least by sending gifts of 
a military type to the sultan. They were therefore hardly surprised when he 
asked them for military assistance, which must therefore be understood in 
the wider context of the diplomatic and social relations between the two 
Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire that have still not been sufficiently 
researched for that period. 
 
Abstract 
The primary goal of the paper is to put the assistance of Austria and Prus-
sia to the Ottoman military reforms in the 1830s into the context of diplo-
matic relations within the Eastern Question, and explain why the Sublime 
Porte asked the two German Powers for their officers, why only the Prus-
sians were finally employed in 1837. Furthermore, the paper also evidenc-
es the fact that the collaboration of the two German Powers with Sultan 
Mahmud II in his reformatory effort must be viewed not only in the dip-
lomatic but also social context and that the changes in the Ottoman army 
had been attentively observed by Austria’s and Prussia’s diplomats, and 
Austrian Chancellor Metternich in particular, long before the employment 
of the two Powers’ officers in the Near East was officially discussed with 
the Ottoman authorities; the Viennese cabinet had even provided the edu-
cation of several Ottoman youths in its Technical military academy. The 
paper is finally intended as a brief contribution to the relations between 
Central Europe, represented in this case by the two most important mem-
bers of the German Confederation, and the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s. 
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